Cyber Attacks as Force Majeure Under the ISDA Master Agreement

With recent events of air traffic control communication failures, bank software “bugs” disrupting access and transactions, widespread Microsoft Outlook outages, and other untold cyber related events which seem to be compounding, it’s easy to wonder “when does a cyber-attack or large scale disruption become force majeure?” Even in less dramatic cases of technology glitches, it’s always a good practice to consider the effects of technological disruptions, including a cyber-attack, on trading.

Bottom Line

A cyber attack can be a Force Majeure Event under Section 5(b)(ii) of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, but the bar is very high. The attack must actually prevent the affected Office from paying, delivering or complying (or make that impossible or impracticable), it must be beyond the party's control, and the party must be unable to work around the cyber-attack using all reasonable efforts.

Most cyber incidents that have hit the derivatives market so far would fail at least one of those tests. The ION Cleared Derivatives ransomware attack that began on January 31, 2023 reportedly affected at least 42 clearing customers. In November 2023, a LockBit attack on ICBC Financial Services disrupted U.S. Treasury settlement. In both cases, trades ultimately settled through manual workarounds, which is exactly what undermines a force majeure claim by the affected party.

The ISDA Framework

The 1992 ISDA Master Agreement has no force majeure Termination Event. A 1992 relationship has one only if the parties adhered to the ISDA Illegality/Force Majeure Protocol, imported the 2002 Master Agreement language in the Schedule, or negotiated a bespoke clause. Otherwise, the affected party is left to common law impossibility, which New York applies very narrowly.

Under the 2002 Master Agreement, a Force Majeure Event exists only if all of the following are true:

  1. Any applicable disruption fallback or remedy in the Confirmation or incorporated definitions has already been exhausted.
  2. The paying and receiving Office is prevented from performing, receiving or complying with a material provision, or doing so becomes impossible or impracticable.
  3. The event is beyond the control of the party, its Office, or its Credit Support Provider.
  4. The party could not overcome the prevention using all reasonable efforts, which do not require incurring a loss other than immaterial, incidental expenses.

New York courts excuse performance only where the clause specifically covers the event (Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Markets, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 900 (1987)). A bare “force majeure” reference with no cyber language is unlikely to survive any scrutiny under New York law.

Applying the Elements to a Cyber-attack

Force majeure or act of state. A widespread attack by an unrelated criminal group is the strongest “force majeure” candidate. A state-sponsored attack adds an “act of state” argument, though that term traditionally means sovereign measures such as capital controls or expropriation, not covert intrusion. There are two non-ISDA related U.S. court cases that may give some guidance. In Heritage Valley Health Sys. v. Nuance Communications, 479 F. Supp. 3d 175 (W.D. Pa. 2020), the court noted in a footnote that the Russian NotPetya attack was arguably beyond the vendor’s reasonable control. In Princeton Community Hospital Ass'n v. Nuance (S.D. W. Va. 2020), the court assumed, without deciding, that NotPetya fit the clause.

Prevented, or merely harder. The test runs at the level of the paying Office. If the party can pay from another Office, through a correspondent, or manually, it is not prevented and there is no force majeure. According to reports of a ransomware attack that ICBC Financial Services faced in 2023, ICBC's U.S. unit reportedly carried trade data to BNY Mellon on a USB drive, and Fedwire hours were extended to complete settlement (Finadium). The “impracticable” prong is softer but untested; ISDA’s own FX definitions review has described impracticability as more nebulous than impossibility (ISDA IQ, May 2024).

Beyond control. Swap Dealers and banks should expect discovery into their security measures. A cyber-attack that exploits an unpatched, publicly known vulnerability or weak access controls invites the argument that preventing or mitigating the cyber event was within the party’s control.

All reasonable efforts. Looking back at the ICBC example, parties must carefully weigh what’s “reasonable”. Note too that this is a higher standard than elsewhere in the ISDA framework that demands “commercially reasonable” measures. “Reasonable” efforts could look like manual processing, alternate settlement agents and backup systems, so long there are only immaterial, incidental expenses. A party that never activated its business continuity plan will struggle to argue force majeure.

What happens if a cyber-attack causes disruptions?

  • Fallbacks come first. A cyber outage at an exchange or price source is usually handled as a Market Disruption Event under the product definitions and never reaches Section 5(b)(ii).
  • The hierarchy cuts both ways. Under Section 5(c), a Force Majeure Event displaces only Sections 5(a)(i), 5(a)(ii)(1) and 5(a)(iii)(1). If the same incident triggers Bankruptcy, Cross-Default or an Additional Termination Event, such as a NAV or ratings trigger, that event controls.
  • The clock is short. Without force majeure, a missed payment becomes an Event of Default under Section 5(a)(i) if not remedied by the first Local Business Day after notice. The real fight is often one day versus an eight-day Waiting Period.

What happens if a cyber-attack qualifies?

If a cyber-attack truly constitutes a Force Majeure Event, it is a Termination Event, not an Event of Default, and the 2002 Master Agreement gives the affected party some relief. Upon notice of the event, a waiting period is triggered, which runs for eight local business days from the event, not the notice. All affected payments and deliveries are deferred for those eight local business days. After which either party may terminate the affected transaction on 2 to 20 days’ notice and close-out amounts are determined on a mid-market basis.  Any deferred amounts accrue interest at the Applicable Deferral Rate.

As ION and ICBC showed, the party that gets attacked is far more likely to end up in a one-day Section 5(a)(i) cure period than in an eight-day Waiting Period. Whether a cyber incident excuses performance or becomes an Event of Default usually turns on work done well before the attack. That work includes which version of the Master Agreement governs the relationship, whether the Schedule or a protocol adds force majeure language, how the Confirmations and incorporated definitions handle disruption fallbacks, and whether the party's business continuity plan will hold up as “all reasonable efforts.”

Now is a good time for market participants to:

  • Assess ISDA documentation. Identify 1992 Master Agreements that have no force majeure Termination Event, consider adherence to the ISDA Illegality/Force Majeure Protocol or amendments to those agreements.
  • Consider cyber-specific provisions. Given Kel Kim, a clause that expressly covers cyber-attacks, ransomware and third-party vendor outages is much more likely to hold up under New York law than a bare reference to “force majeure.” Banks that lend to and transact with and businesses that may be particularly susceptible to being targets of cyber-attacks may wish to consider tailored provisions.
  • Operational readiness. Assess how functional stakeholders would react to outages and cyber-attacks in respect of payments, settlements and other critical trading infrastructure.

Moore & Van Allen’s Derivatives &  Trading Team regularly advises dealers, banks, funds and corporate end users on all aspects of ISDA documentation, including market disruption events, and fallback and force majeure provisions.

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